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ABSTRACT 
The last few years have seen a rapid increase in the discussion of 
the role of new technologies in strengthening social safety nets. 
However, the hypothesis that technology design is intertwined 
with political agendas - aiming at instilling specific visions and 
policy objectives in anti-poverty programmes - has remained to a 
large extent unexplored, being either taken as implicit or 
neglected by technical discourse. In this paper, we look at 
computerization of a large food security programme - the Public 
Distribution System in Karnataka, India - to argue that 
technology, far from simply affecting the functioning of existing 
processes, can be built to advance specific political agendas, 
which carry clear stances on the ways in which social welfare 
targets are to be reached. However, recipients’ perception of these 
programmes depends highly on how technology affects access to 
their entitlements, which need therefore to be set at the core of 
anti-poverty technology design. The case study is used to draw 
lessons for policy, specifically aimed at countries embarking into 
computerization of their social safety nets. 
 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.1.2 [Information Systems]: User/Machine Systems – human 
factors, human information processing. 
 
General Terms 
Management, Economics, Reliability, Security, Human Factors, 
Verification. 
 
Keywords 
E-governance, computerization, social safety nets, food security, 
Public Distribution System, India, Karnataka. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last years, the discourse on the use of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) for achievements in the 
domain of poverty reduction has become one of the dominant 
themes in ICT4D [6]. Narrative on this domain has peaked in 
recent times, potentially as a result of the globally increasing 
reliance on social safety nets: state-level programmes protecting 
the needful from food insecurity, unemployment, and the 
“substantial unfreedoms” [20] threatening the quality of their lives 
are increasingly being leveraged in combating poverty. Anti-
poverty programmes - a term that encompasses the social safety 
nets designed with the purpose of poverty reduction - are 
increasingly being imbued with technology, in all their phases 
from design to delivery. Discourse on “end-to-end 
computerization”, aimed at increasing effectiveness and 
accountability of social welfare providers, is steadily gaining 
hegemony in this respect. 
 
And still, discourse on digitalization is predominantly crafted in a 
results-oriented fashion, leading to a focus on “what can be 
obtained” through the application of ICTs to existing processes. 
Hegemony of this thematic thread, connecting technology with its 
actual and expected outcomes in anti-poverty practice, is leading 
to an intrinsically technical vision of anti-poverty artefacts: 
dichotomic categorizations (primarily, discourse on “success” and 
“failure”) have become paramount, along with explanatory 
analyses of the factors that led to such outcomes. On the one 
hand, a results-oriented vision does serve the purposes of policy 
prescription, based on identifying best practice and equipping 
policymakers to avoid failure. Yet, the same perspective may lead 
to lose sight of the processes into play: human, social, and 
contextual principles, underlying the construction of anti-poverty 
artefacts, may disappear from the causal narrative that constitutes 
the hegemonic discourse. 
 
In contrast, information systems literature [3, 16, 21] has explored 
the hypothesis that political context may have a role in explaining 
the architecture of artefacts, along with their practical 
implementation and usage. The idea that “artefacts have politics” 
[21], meaning that they constitute the physical embodiment of the 
vision/objectives of those conceiving them, has been articulated 
through the prism of social embeddedness: in this view, 
technologies are seen as the byproduct of their context, which in 
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turn they influence as a result of users’ adoption. Over the last 
decade, the paradigm of social embeddedness has been applied to 
ICT4D [1]: this results in the argument that ICT-based 
development programmes arise, in large part, from locally 
relevant views and needs. This view culminates in the hypothesis 
that technology can advance a specific meaning of development, 
enacted by policymakers in ICT4D programmes [17]. 
 
The hypothesis in point - while widely discussed in information 
systems - has remained, to a large extent, unexplored by the main 
discourse on technology for anti-poverty programmes. In this 
paper, we examine it through a case study of computerization of a 
large anti-poverty scheme, namely the Public Distribution System 
(PDS) in Karnataka, southern India. The PDS, a programme based 
on subsidization of primary necessity items to poorer households, 
is the main food security net in contemporary India: in Karnataka, 
its computerization has occurred through a back-end process 
(development of a database of entitlements, and of a supply chain 
monitoring system) and a front-end one (biometric tracking of 
transactions to beneficiaries). Our work, consisting in an in-depth 
case study of the PDS in Karnataka, aims to shed light on the 
intertwining between development of an anti-poverty artefact, and 
the agenda for food security in which it is embedded. 
 
Our results present a mixed picture of the interaction between 
politics and the system. On the one hand, the Karnataka IT system 
for PDS - as an ensemble of its back-end and front-end 
components - is found to be conceived as a carrier of three main 
functions (prevention of misappropriation, mismanagement, and 
diversion) which, taken together, configure a clear political 
agenda against leakage of commodities from the programme. This 
agenda comes with clear assumptions on the actors of corruption, 
their behavioural patterns, and the optimal ways to detect them: in 
practice, the system is constructed to “carry politics” [3] for an 
agenda against leakage of foodgrains. On the other hand, the 
extent to which this agenda is perceived by the programme’s 
beneficiaries - as they access the computerized PDS - is limited: 
technology is seen, by its users, in terms of its effect on 
entitlements, which are not always made smoother by the 
transition to a biometric PDS. Citizens’ narratives, taken together, 
lead to place a caveat on anti-poverty technologies: in their design 
and implementation, these need to be firmly rooted on 
beneficiaries’ access to programme entitlements. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
theoretical perspective of social embeddedness, with a focus on 
the political context of technology in ICT4D. Section 3 explains 
our methodology, based on an interpretive case study of the IT 
system for PDS in Karnataka. Section 4 describes the artefact at 
the core of our research, which we analyze in Section 5: first, we 
review the inscription of three functions (prevention of 
misappropriation, mismanagement, and diversion) in the IT 
system’s design. Then, we examine users’ narratives to argue that, 
for that agenda to be translated into practice, citizens’ entitlements 
should be placed at the core of the anti-poverty information 
system. Section 6 concludes, drawing lessons for other states 
engaging in computerization of their social safety nets. 
 
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Discourse on end-to-end computerization of social safety nets, 
with specific respect to its adoption in anti-poverty programmes, 
constitutes the broader domain of our research. The theoretical 
perspective detailed below allows us to convert this problem area 
into specific questions for our study.  
 
The idea that “artefacts have politics”, as articulated by Winner 
[21], is at the root of the theoretical understanding of 
computerization presented here. The argument underlying this 
notion is that artefacts, rather than being just the technical means 
to carry out pre-determined actions, are actually the physical 
embodiment of the visions/goals of their makers, or of those in 
charge of informing their development. These visions, when it 
comes to the public sector, tend to acquire the nature of political 
projects: this means that artefacts are constructed, and 
implemented in practice, in order to pursue some political 
accomplishments, in line with the worldview of policymakers and 
the objectives stemming from it. 
 
In fact, the vision of technology as a “carrier of politics” (Cordella 
and Iannacci 2010) could run the risk of been deemed or rejected 
as technologically deterministic, i.e. as imbued with a too ready 
causal relation between technology adoption and some given 
effects. The distinction between a deterministic tool view, of 
technology as a means to specific outcomes, and an ensemble 
view, in which technology emerges from its context of 
application, is made by Orlikowski and Iacono [16]: in the 
ensemble view, 
 
The conceptualization of technology (…) is that of an 
evolving system embedded in a complex and dynamic 
social context. Technology is neither an independent nor 
dependent variable, but instead is seen to be enmeshed 
with the conditions of its use – hence our label “embedded 
system”. [16: 126] 
 
The ensemble view leads, therefore, to a worldview in which 
technology, rather than being causally linked to any effect, is 
embedded in its context of action, and emerges from it while, at 
the same time, influencing its features. Having gained substantial 
grounds in the information systems domain, the idea of 
technology as socially embedded is then applied to the specific 
area of ICT4D: 
 
Authors of the social embeddedness discourse view 
innovation as a locally socially constructed course of 
action (...) its purpose arises from local problematizations, 
and its course is determined by the way local actors make 
sense of it and accommodate it in their lives. [1: 135] 
 
In Avgerou’s work [1], the discourse of social embeddedness is 
viewed in opposition to another dominant perspective in ICT4D, 
namely that of “technology transfer”: in this view, developing 
countries are constructed as keen to “catch up” with the 
industrialized  world, by transferring technologies and knowledge 
from outside. The argument of social embeddedness disputes this 
view, by stating that technology is not necessarily “transferred” to 
the developing world: diversely, developing nations conceive new 
technologies according to their own needs and perspectives, and 
implementation is led on the basis of locally relevant content and 
necessities.  
 
Our perspective is firmly grounded on Avgerou’s views, as we 
devise our contribution to the interdisciplinary domain of ICT4D. 
Regarding technology as the socially embedded byproduct of its 
context, we observe two particular points on ICTs in anti-poverty 
programmes: first, when it comes to technologies developed for 
the public sector, the political context of action (with regards to 
the goals of policymaking for poverty reduction) needs to be 
explicitly taken into account [13]. Second, as we look at 
programmes which belong to social safety nets in the developing 
world, the political context embodies a view of what constitutes 
development - rather than just a general idea of mechanisms for 
the improvement of social safety nets [17]. Hence, technology 
may be used to advance a specific vision or meaning of 
development, enacted by policymakers in ICT4D programmes. 
 
Our research is firmly predicated on social embeddedness, 
intended through the arguments on political context and on the 
presence of a meaning of development in technological artefacts. 
This perspective led us to structure our problem area into two 
questions for our research, namely: what links are there between 
anti-poverty artefacts and the policy agendas behind them? And if 
a policy agenda surfaces, how is it designed on paper - and 
articulated in practice, through the perception of beneficiaries? 
Our methodology, based on an interpretive case study of 
Karnataka, has been devised in order to provide structured 
responses to these questions. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Our research questions required close observation of the 
intertwining between technology and political context, with 
reference to anti-poverty programmes. This led us to approach 
them through a method - an in-depth, interpretive case study - 
which is particularly suited to process-related questions, regarding 
ongoing dynamics unfolding on the field. Our aim, in doing so, is 
close to Gregor’s [5] notion of analytical theory-building: our 
purpose has been that of generating theory with an inherently 
descriptive nature, on phenomena on which existing knowledge in 
theory/practice is limited. This descriptive purpose, as conceived 
in the paper, is coupled with a normative one that builds on it, as 
we use our case study findings to draw lessons for states 
computerizing their social safety nets. 
 
To answer our questions, we needed a case study of an anti-
poverty net that is undergoing the process of end-to-end 
computerization, to which our problem area refers. This led us to 
focus on Karnataka, a southern Indian state in which the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) is currently being computerized. The 
PDS is the biggest food security programme in India [8]: it 
consists in subsidization of primary goods such as rice, wheat, 
sugar and kerosene, which are procured at the central government 
level and redistributed to below-poverty-line (BPL) households 
through fair-price shops (known as ration shops) in all states. The 
PDS contributes to social safety, and ultimately to reductions in 
the poverty gap index [4], by making primary goods affordable to 
poorer families, thereby improving their capability of achieving 
sufficient nutritional levels.  
 
The artefact at the core of our research, i.e. the IT system for the 
PDS in Karnataka, is described below. Our engagement with the 
field, including preliminary fact-finding visits, has lasted from 
January to September 2014. Our data consist primarily of 
narratives collected from actors involved in the system, largely 
belonging to the groups of (1) software developers (National 
Informatics Centre, Karnataka) and technology implementers, (2) 
policymakers and actors using the IT system to deliver the PDS 
programme (staff at PDS godowns, and at the ration shops where 
goods are sold), and (3) citizens using the system (approached 
primarily inside the ration shops, at the moment of purchase). In 
observance of the case study method [22], we have triangulated 
our narrative data with other sources, primarily participant 
observation conducted in the ration shops - where an IT-based 
interface, namely a weighing-cum-point of sale machine, 
structures interactions between the ration dealers and the citizens 
who make their purchases. As a completion to this, documents 
related to the PDS in Karnataka, and to the diverse phases of IT 
implementation within it, have been analyzed by the authors. 
 
4. CASE STUDY 
The core mechanism of the PDS, based on a central government 
agency (the Food Corporation of India – FCI) procuring 
foodgrains and redistributing them at subsidized prices, was 
instituted in 1965. The programme was originally designed as 
universal, i.e. accessible by all citizens: the fiscal crisis of the 
early 1990s, along with the structural adjustment policies that 
followed, led the central government to switch to a targeted 
system in 1997. In the targeted PDS, access is restricted to BPL 
households, among which the poorest of the poor (coming under 
the Antyodaya Anna Yojana – AAY classification) are entitled to 
higher quantities of subsidized goods: only in a few states some 
limited subsidies are still available for the above-poverty-line 
(APL).1 PDS implementation, while informed by central 
government directives, is conducted at the state level, and this 
results in sharp differences in the programme’s impact on poverty 
reduction across states [4, 7]. 
 
Karnataka has been known, since the establishment of the 
programme, for operating a quite well-functioning PDS, featuring 
high levels of utilization by BPL and AAY households [10]. It is a 
state whose social schemes are closely dedicated to vulnerable 
groups: attention to poorer households was manifest since 1985, 
when a “green card” scheme allowed, in the universal PDS, to 
guarantee specific subsidies to the poor [14]. This, combined with 
local dynamics that see the PDS at the core of electoral 
competition [15], has culminated in 2013 with the Anna Bhagya 
scheme, which provides very high subsidies to the BPL – rice and 
wheat are sold at Re. 1 per kg., in quantities that vary according to 
the number of household members, and are fixed at 29 kg. per 
month for the AAY (see Table 1). As per its construction, the 
scheme aims at constituting a viable means to food security for 
vulnerable households. 
 
Table 1: Entitlement to Foodgrains under the Karnataka PDS 
Status 
Entitlement - quotas  
(per size of household) 
Entitlement - price 
APL None 
 
None 
 
BPL 
1 member: 8 kg. 
2 members: 16 kg. 
3 or more members: 24 kg.     
Rice: Rs. 1/- per kg.  
Wheat: Rs. 1/- per kg. 
AAY 29 kg. (any household size) 
 
                                                                
1 The only exception here is Tamil Nadu, which maintained a 
universal system in spite of the central government’s shift to a 
targeted PDS. 
The system suffers, though, from systematic diversion of goods 
outside its own supply chain. The problem of leakage, fostered by 
the price difference between PDS and the market, is a nationwide 
one, with an estimated yearly 57% of PDS commodities not 
reaching the beneficiaries [19]. On the one hand, a share of these 
losses might be due to issues in transportation and storage: most 
problematically though, PDS goods are subject to diversion to 
black market networks, by agents exploiting the diverse 
opportunities to do so [11]. In particular, ration dealers across the 
nation have been severely hit by the shift to a targeted PDS: as a 
result of the shrink in eligible users (from all citizens to just 
BPL/AAY), ration shops have become increasingly unviable, and 
many have been forced to shut down or become corrupted [12].2 
Leakage from the PDS strongly limits the efficacy of the 
programme, as it reduces the amount of subsidized goods 
available to users. 
 
Computerization of the Karnataka PDS system started in 2005. 
The initial idea consisted in construction of a database of all users 
entitled to the PDS: in this way, a list of genuine beneficiaries 
would be created, and ration cards (household-based documents 
of entitlement to the PDS) would be assigned consequently. The 
following step, with the systems’ construction, aimed at ensuring 
that only people with genuine entitlements could access PDS 
goods: this was pursued through computerization of the systems’ 
supply chain, including transactions in the ration shops. 
 
The present version of the IT system for PDS, developed by the 
National Informatics Centre (NIC) Karnataka, is substantiated 
into three modules, each of which plays a key part in guaranteeing 
the good functioning of the programme. More specifically: 
 
Module 1, known as Ahara (meaning “food” in the local 
language), is a ration card database, in which details of all 
cardholders registered in the state are stored. A ration card reports 
the household’s address,3 as well as its poverty status and number 
of family members: for BPL citizens, entitlement is indeed based 
on these data. The ration card needs to be presented to the ration 
dealer at all times when buying PDS commodities, as it 
constitutes the proof of entitlement to the system. 
 
Initially, construction of the database was problematic, after 
outsourcing to a private vendor ended up in unsuccessful 
outcomes. In 2009, “temporary ration cards” were released, 
without proper verification of the identity or entitlement of 
applicants: as a result, virtually all citizens could benefit from the 
system, and get subsidized commodities from it. In 2010, ration 
cards in Karnataka largely exceeded the number of existing 
households, let alone that of genuine beneficiaries [9]: therefore, 
needful recipients incurred the risk of being deprived of the 
commodities reserved to them.  
 
                                                                
2 Under the targeted system in Karnataka, APL citizens have no 
entitlement to subsidized foodgrains or sugar, as they have been 
phased out of the food security programme. The benefits that 
they receive are limited to subsidized kerosene. 
3 Address is needed on ration cards, as it is on the basis of it that 
the ration shop of reference is determined – geographical 
proximity is the criterion for determination. 
In this situation, under the former Secretary of Food and Civil 
Supplies, a system was designed to cancel bogus ration cards, and 
guarantee the authenticity of the existing ones. This was based on 
two different routes to verification: urban households would have 
to provide a RR number (signifying a valid electricity 
connection), whereas rural households would have to provide 
their property identification number.4 In this way, a door-to-door 
survey of users was not required: cardholders were requested to 
provide their details along with their photographs and finger 
prints, at photo-bio centres set-up at multiple locations (through 
franchised outlets in urban areas, and in the offices of the gram 
panchayats in rural areas). Details of cardholders registered with 
each ration shop are now available through the database hosted at 
http://ahara.kar.nic.in.  
 
Module 2 (Financial and Stock Accounting System – FIST) is a 
software for supply chain monitoring, aimed at checking PDS 
transactions that occur before the goods reach the ration shops. 
The PDS supply chain, illustrated in Figure 1, consists of three 
main phases: goods, procured by the FCI and private producers,5 
are distributed at the district level through Authorized Wholesale 
Dealers (known as wholesale points or godowns), and then lifted 
by the ration dealers, who in turn provide them to beneficiaries. 
 
 
 
 
                                            Phase 1          
 
 
 
                                                                 Phase 2 
 
 
 
                                                                                     Phase 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Phases of the PDS Supply Chain 
 
The FIST software, utilized at the wholesale points and operated 
by their managers, registers the amount of goods that come in 
from FCI and private producers every month [phase 1 above], and 
the amount that is lifted by every ration dealer, as the monthly 
allotment is distributed [phase 2]. The monthly amount of goods 
assigned to each ration shop is based on the theoretical 
                                                                
4 A recent measure requires registration of EPIC (Electoral Photo 
Identification Card, issued by the Election Commission of India) 
or Aadhaar number (issued by the Unique Identification Authority 
of India, UIDAI) with every ration card, for the purpose of 
guaranteeing authenticity and uniqueness of the card. 
5 In Karnataka, the FCI provides rice and wheat, which are in turn   
procured from foodgrain-producing states. Sugar comes, instead, 
from local mills, whereas kerosene is provided by state-owned oil 
companies.  
Suppliers 
(FCI, private 
producers) 
Authorized 
Wholesale
Dealers                                                    
Authorized 
Ration 
Dealers 
 
 
Beneficiaries 
 
requirement, determined through the number and status of ration 
cards registered at every shop, and the closing balance, i.e. the 
commodities left in stock at the end of each month. All data are 
entered in the system by godown managers, who access it through 
personal logins that lead to traceability of all operations. The 
function of the FIST software, by tracking all transactions in 
phases 1 and 2, is that of impeding diversion of commodities at 
the back-end level.  
 
Module 3 consists in a system to control the transactions 
conducted at each ration shop. While FIST controls phases 1 and 
2 in the supply chain, the transaction tracking system checks 
phase 3: it consists in biometric weighing-cum-point of sale 
machines, installed in ration shops and utilized to carry out 
transactions with the customers. Transaction tracking through the 
machines has been implemented in only 6 of the 29 districts of the 
state: end-to-end computerization, when completed, will involve 
its implementation in all ration shops. 
 
                           
 
Figure 2: Biometric Weighing-cum-Point of Sale 
Machine 
© Silvia Masiero, 2015 
 
 
The weighing-cum-point of sale machine (Figure 2) for PDS 
works as follows. Users, as they buy their rations, are identified 
through their ration card number, which is entered first, and their 
thumb impression: as they provide these details, the machine 
recognizes the user, and displays their card number and 
entitlement on the screen. As the ration dealer weighs 
commodities, the machine’s speakers announce, in local language 
(Kannada), the type and quantity of goods being sold: as the 
transaction is completed, a bill for it is printed. The machine’s 
embedded system is constructed to prevent ration dealers from 
selling less (or more) than one’s entitlement at every transaction. 
On a monthly basis, the machine registers all sales conducted at 
each ration shop: the closing balance is then submitted to FIST, 
and contributes to determining the allotment that is due in the 
subsequent month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Synopsis of E-PDS Modules 
 
E-PDS Modules 
No. Name Core Function Nature 
1 
Ahara – 
Ration Card 
Database 
Guarantees authenticity of 
users’ entitlements 
Back-end 
2 
Financial and 
Stock 
Accounting 
System (FIST) 
Registers the amount of 
goods received by 
wholesale points, and of 
those lifted by ration 
dealers, every month  
 
Back-end 
3 
Biometric 
Control on 
Transactions  
Guarantees authenticity of 
users’ entitlements and 
regularity of PDS purchases 
Front-end 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes the three modules of the system, which, taken 
together, form the anti-poverty artefact at the core of PDS. On the 
one hand, the implementation of weighing-cum-point of sale 
machines has gained high attention by media and policy press. In 
effect, in promoting computerization of the PDS, the Department 
of Food and Civil Supplies has leveraged quite highly on the 
machine, as the previous Secretary told us:  
 
The machine is the real innovation in the system. With it, 
ration dealers cannot cheat their beneficiaries, and people 
owning fake ration cards cannot access subsidized goods.  
 
And still, as illustrated in the table, the IT system for the PDS is a 
composite artefact, in which each module acts in completion to 
the others, rather than as a self-standing unit. In the system, 
weighing-cum-point of sale machines are based on data stored in 
Ahara, and provide closing balances to be inserted into the FIST 
software. As noted by the Technical Director at NIC Karnataka: 
 
The IT system consists of Ahara, FIST, and biometric 
machines. All parts are equally important, and together 
they guarantee computerization of the whole system. 
 
Hence, the object at the core of our study is not to be regarded as 
a single tool, but as an assemblage composed by three 
technologies which, in their mutual relations, form a composite 
anti-poverty artefact. End-to-end computerization is therefore 
pursued across the three phases of the supply chain. 
 
5. ANALYSIS 
So far, we have detailed the properties of the artefact at the core of 
our work. To answer our research questions, the same artefact 
needs to be analyzed, in terms of the intertwining between 
technology and the political domain around it. First, we examine 
the relation between technology design and food security policy, 
with regards to the context of reference: then we observe the same 
relation through the narratives of beneficiaries, whose views of 
the PDS are mediated by the IT system. From the combination of 
these perspectives, we draw lessons based on how technology 
interacts with the politics of food security around it. 
 
5.1 Re-Designing the Public Distribution 
System through Computerization 
In the results-oriented perspective on computerization, technology 
is seen primarily as a means to greater effectiveness and 
accountability of social safety nets. It serves, in this view, the 
purpose of improving existing mechanisms: we explore, instead, 
the idea that technology design, and the implementation that 
follows it, may carry a food security agenda, with its own 
assumptions and priorities. To explore this hypothesis, we 
interrogate technology design, and the multiple ways in which its 
contents are transferred into an anti-poverty artefact. 
 
As we observe technology in action, several functions seem to be 
inscribed in the IT system for the PDS. Actors’ recounts led us to 
appraise three different functions, and the ways in which they 
relate to each other in practice. Functions elicited in the system 
are as follows: 
 
Preventing misappropriation of PDS goods from ineligible 
citizens. As the PDS determines a situation of dual prices, in 
which the one on the anti-poverty system is lower than that on the 
market, there is an incentive for citizens to illegally appropriate 
subsidized goods. This was easier when, through “temporary” 
ration cards which were not properly verified, virtually everyone 
could access the PDS. Technology, applied to transactions in the 
ration shops, aims at preventing non-entitled people from 
accessing the system, as noted by one of the Technical Directors 
at NIC Karnataka: 
 
The biometric machine prevents those with a bogus card 
from buying goods from the system. This enables people, 
who really need the PDS, to get the goods from the 
programme. Bogus cards led to frequent stealing, and to 
users finding themselves with no goods left for them.  
 
There are two notes to be made here. First, the weighing-cum-
point of sale machine does not act on its own in preventing 
misappropriation. It is, instead, the assemblage constituted by the 
machine and the ration card database, which prevents the sale of 
commodities to anyone who is not registered in the system. 
Second, the assumption that citizens are involved in diversion 
from the PDS plays a key role here: it is, indeed, to combat this 
form of leakage that biometric technology has been implemented.  
 
Preventing misbehaviour from ration dealers. In spite of the 
strong emphasis on biometric identification, non-entitled users are 
only one of the sources of leakage from the PDS. A large share of 
the problem is, instead, attributed to misbehaviour from ration 
dealers, who can either cheat on quantity/price in transactions 
(sell less commodities at higher price, as compared to 
entitlements) or pretend having “run out” of goods, and diverting 
them to the market instead. 
 
Based on awareness of these problems, the weighing-cum-point of 
sale machine is constructed in order to ensure the regularity of all 
transactions. This function is inscribed in the machine’s design: at 
the moment of purchase, speakers announce the type, quantity and 
price of goods being sold, making sure that they correspond 
exactly to the entitlement of the citizen. Thanks to connection to 
the Ahara database, the machine recognizes registered 
beneficiaries, and reveals, upon biometric identification, the exact 
amount of goods to which they are entitled. This prevents ration 
dealers from cheating on the quantity and price of goods being 
sold, as revealed by an official in the Department of Food and 
Civil Supplies: 
 
The machine is done in such a way that the user cannot be 
cheated, because it knows and announces exactly the 
entitlement of the recipient, and makes it certain that the 
ration dealer will sell (exactly) those quantities. In this 
way, we guarantee the poor that their goods are delivered. 
 
Once again, the machine does not work per se in this task, but 
recognizes entitlements on the basis of the Ahara database 
connected to it. The problem of ration dealers “running out” of 
goods, and therefore not serving their customers, has been solved 
by a fixed time schedule, described by the Commissioner of Food 
and Civil Supplies: 
 
Every month, ration dealers are obliged to distribute PDS 
commodities between the 1st and the 10th. Citizens know 
it, so they know exactly when to go to the ration shop, and 
expect their rations to be there. If the ration is not there, 
then they can take action. 
 
Technology seems, therefore, to be part of a broader 
accountability structure, which has been conceived to guarantee 
regularity and prevent misbehaviour from ration dealers. The 
assumption here is that such misbehaviour is embedded in the 
dynamics of leakage, and is to be faced through a strategy in 
which technology plays a key role. 
 
Preventing back-end diversion of foodgrains. Attention here 
focuses on the parts of the supply chain (phases 1 and 2) which 
unfold before the ration shops, pertaining to transportation of 
commodities from FCI/private producers to wholesale points, and 
then from these to ration dealers. The software for finance and 
stock accounting (FIST) controls regularity of these operations, 
and is designed in order to detect mismanagement occurring 
within them. As noted by another official at the Department, 
 
The software has been designed in such a way that goods 
are checked both as they come in, and as they leave from 
godowns. The software has a monitoring function, which 
verifies that everything is transparent. 
 
This function, with reference to the early stages of the supply 
chain, is particularly important, as discourse in the social sphere 
reveals one clear pattern: the largest share of diversion happens 
here, in the early stages of the supply chain, rather than in the 
ration shops [18]. As paradigmatically observed by a Food 
Inspector, 
 
Transactions in the shops are to be monitored, but the real 
monitoring has to happen in the godowns. In the ration 
shop, maybe a few bags of rice will disappear, and go to 
the private market. But in the earlier phases, entire trucks 
of rice may be diverted (...) this is why it is so important 
to monitor this stage. 
 
The third function inscribed in technology is, therefore, that of 
preventing diversion as it occurs in the early stages of the supply 
chain. It is a form of corruption that is less visible, as compared to 
that in the ration shops: but it is, at the same time, the one that 
seems to affect the system in the most problematic ways. 
 Combined together, the three functions above provide an answer 
to our first research question, on the relation between technology 
and the food security policy behind it. The answer is found in 
technology design, which breaks leakage in three causal elements 
(misappropriation from customers, mismanagement from ration 
dealers, and diversion at earlier stages) and engages in combating 
them one by one, on the basis of clear assumptions and priorities. 
Technology does not seem, therefore, to be simply enacting 
existing processes: it operates, instead, as a means to embody a 
specific food security agenda. 
 
5.2 Narratives on Technology and its 
Outcomes on the Food Security System 
As per the above, the technology constructed for the PDS in 
Karnataka seems to be the carrier of a specific policy agenda, 
focused on combating leakage and maximizing users’ capabilities 
to get their entitlements. Our second research question explores 
implementation, in terms of how this agenda is translated into 
practice. This needs to be explored, in the first place, through the 
eyes of users, for whom technology constitutes a novel means to 
accessing a core anti-poverty programme. 
 
PDS users access the IT system in terms of its front-end 
component, namely the weighing-cum-point of sale machine. 
Their encounter with the system is, therefore, structured through 
this technology – rather than through the back-end system, which 
they do not experience in their monthly transactions. In particular, 
the machine checks that everyone’s entitlement is respected, as 
noted by a BPL user in Tumkur district: 
 
Before, one could not really be sure on whether the ration 
dealer was selling the right amount of rice. With the 
machine, weighing is automatic, hence this is not anymore 
a problem. 
 
Still, narratives of easy access and greater accountability become 
somehow more blurred, when explored through the multiple 
experiences of citizens encountered in the ration shops. On the 
one hand, technology design is informed through the principles of 
combating misappropriation, mismanagement and diversion of 
goods, as illustrated above. Yet, on the other hand, experience of 
the system gives rise to narratives in which other themes are 
recurrent: 
 
Absence of monitoring. As observed above, citizens’ encounters 
with technology happen through the front-end interface, rather 
than through diverse parts of the anti-poverty artefact. One 
recurrent thread of narrative, among our interviewees, is that of 
the identification of IT for PDS with “the machine” itself, rather 
than with the system as a whole. This would not be problematic 
per se, if it did not result in the diffused perception of supply 
chain monitoring as absent from the PDS: citizens see the 
machine, as it structures their transactions, but they cannot “see” 
the software behind it. This leads many to feel unprotected from 
large-scale corruption, as reported by a user in Bangalore: 
 
They have put biometric machines in all ration shops, but 
corruption is not here. Rather, it is in the godowns, from 
where a lot of goods disappear, and nothing is really done 
about it (...) why spend loads of money on biometrics, 
when the real corruption is in another place? 
 
One way to limit the problem of perceived absence of monitoring 
is that of availing a recently devised SMS service, developed by 
NIC Karnataka for communication between the wholesale points 
and the panchayats. Since 2013, all panchayats in the state are 
registered with a service of SMS alerts, which are automatically 
sent to them every time one of the local ration dealers lifts their 
foodgrains from the wholesale point. The system, according to the 
staff at NIC Karnataka, is in operation throughout the state: 
however, none of our interviewees was aware of it. If it was 
utilized, the system could provide a window of observation on 
back-end monitoring, since most citizens in Karnataka own a 
basic mobile phone on which SMS can be received.  
 
Furthermore, apart from the lack of monitoring, another form of 
absence is perceived around quality control of PDS goods. Many 
users are, indeed, dissatisfied with the quality of PDS foodgrains, 
to the point that they report being barely able to eat them– if not, 
some of them say, along with other (more expensive) types of 
food. In some cases, PDS food is not even considered fit for 
consumption, as paradigmatically reported by a BPL user in Kolar 
district: 
 
PDS rice is not good enough, we feed it to the goats. We 
still buy it, because it is very cheap, but we feed it to the 
goats as it is too low quality (to eat it).  
 
Multiple narratives reveal cases of citizens, even BPL, feeding 
PDS food to the animals because of low quality. Indeed, quality 
control seems to be the “big absentee” from the PDS, and from 
the IT monitoring devised for it. On paper, quality control does 
somehow exist, as “quality inspectors” seem to be operating at the 
FCI level: also, the description of the ration dealers’ job includes 
providing a sample of PDS rice, for customers to check what 
expected quality should be. However, none of the ration dealers 
we visited was aware of this: we have, instead, witnessed the 
presence of bags of rice that were full of mud, which could 
probably not have passed any form whatsoever of quality control. 
Perceived absence of technology is, therefore, a key thread in the 
narratives of users: this concerns both quantity, as awareness of 
supply chain monitoring is very limited, and quality, since no 
control of this kind seems to be in place. 
 
Exclusion of beneficiaries. Another issue is perceived as very 
critical with respect to technology: this is an issue of exclusion, 
i.e. access complications that were not there before 
computerization. This is the case for those citizens who, for 
various reasons, experienced issues using the biometric machines, 
and sometimes had rations denied as a result. This leads to clear 
grievances against the biometric system, which is blamed for 
denying entitlements rather than simplifying access to them. 
 
There are several problems that can arise from the biometric 
system. The one that featured most strongly in citizens’ narratives 
regards the users’ fingerprint not being recognized by the 
machine. When that happens, a message on the machine’s screen 
invites the user to send another member of their family, to 
perform the identification: indeed, all households’ members are 
supposed to have their biometric details registered in the system. 
If that option works, rations can be sold, otherwise the process 
can be very long, as revealed by a citizen in Bangalore:  
 
Cash payments were more risky, because (one) could 
never know how much rice the ration dealer was selling. 
They could have cheated easily (...) but now, many 
citizens cannot really buy their rations, because the system 
does not recognize them. 
 
Another problem, which may result in rations being denied to 
citizens, happens when the ration dealer does not pay the 
connectivity bill. Biometric machines have a 2G connection, 
through which they can access the ration card database – and 
perform identification of citizens: ration dealers should pay the 
bills for this, and the Department of Food and Civil Supplies 
should then refund them. However, if bills are not paid, changes 
in ration card details are not registered: hence, whoever had their 
ration card renewed or modified is unable to get rations from their 
shop. In a ration shop in Bangalore, we witnessed the case of a 
woman being denied her ration for the fourth month in a row, as a 
result of lacking recognition derived from the ration dealers’ 
missed payment of connectivity bills.  
 
According to this narrative thread, the outcome of technology 
ends up being, paradoxically, the opposite of that inscribed in 
design. The system, which has been constructed to maximize 
people’s capabilities to access their entitlements, ends up denying 
these: on the one hand, it is true that this results from errors in 
implementation (biometric recognition, payment of bills) rather 
than in the original idea. But still, these errors can lead to 
profoundly undesired outcomes, in which rations are denied to 
their intended beneficiaries. 
 
Manipulation of the IT system. The system’s capability to enable 
users’ access to entitlements is predicated on its good functioning, 
and on the fact that those operating it do so in the correct way. 
But this is not necessarily the case: a third narrative thread, among 
actors involved with the PDS, is one that suggests the possibility 
of manipulation, both at the ration shop and at the wholesale point 
level. This is because, as noted above, an incentive to corruption 
exists (in particular for ration dealers, whose viability has been 
put in peril by targeting): who benefits from diversion does, 
therefore, have an incentive to bypass technology, in order to keep 
gaining illicit profits. 
 
This is the case for the narratives around ration dealers’ 
behaviour, since the machine is said, by many parts, to be 
systematically misused, so that exactly the functions that should 
ensure accountability can be manipulated. In more than half of the 
ration shops we visited, the speakers – that should announce 
quantity and price of goods being sold – were muted: that means 
that people do not know if the goods match their entitlement 
(there is a bill printed out from the machine, but that is of little 
use for the many users who cannot read and write). In other cases, 
users and even Departments’ officials sustain that the machine is 
prone to manipulation, as declared by an official: 
 
Ration dealers can add weights to the scale, in order to 
sell less goods to the people, and divert the remaining 
ones. The problem remains, as they benefit from 
corruption and do all they can to maintain it. 
 
As well as in the ration shops, technology in the wholesale points 
can be compromised. Registers of goods coming in and out, while 
supported by the software, are still paper-based: food inspectors 
should control the outputs of the system, but often resort to the 
easier practice (more entrenched in previous routines) to check the 
paper register instead. If paper-based systems keep operating on 
the side of computerized ones, the opportunity for diversion 
remains, because computerized control is not perceived as needed: 
this leaves room for corrupted practices, and for them to remain 
unseen in the paper registers. The link between incentive to 
corruption and mismanagement of technology is made by a 
Technical Director at NIC Karnataka: 
 
Corruption is still strong, because it brings advantages to 
the PDS agents. If the system was being used correctly 
(according to design), then it would be perfect, but 
willingness to corruption makes this difficult to achieve.  
 
On the one hand, diversion (especially when located at the back-
end level) is hardly observable, hence it is more the object of 
speculation than that of actual investigations. But on the other 
hand, one point can be made: computerization, while facing the 
effect of diversion (combating corruption by tracking transactions 
throughout the supply chain), does not point to its cause, or to any 
of the factors that may determine an incentive to corruption. The 
system is still targeted, and no major measures are taken for ration 
dealers to increase the viability of shops: for example, 
commissions on ration goods could be increased, and explicit 
plans could be made for the incentive to diversion to be reduced. 
Misuse of technology would then be attacked at its very basis.  
 
The three narrative threads, recurring among users’ recounts and 
examined here, point to the idea that, in spite of design carrying a 
clear agenda against leakage, implementation may be unable to 
translate that agenda into practice. We need, therefore, to regard 
design and implementation as related to each other, for the gap 
between them to be reduced. 
 
5.3 Entitlements as the Core of Anti-Poverty 
Technologies 
We have illustrated, in response to our first research question, the 
existence of a political agenda on food security, inscribed in the 
IT system for the PDS in Karnataka. In response to our second 
question, a gap between design and implementation has been 
identified: technology has been designed to fight the main sources 
of leakage, but implementation may lead to the undesired 
outcomes of perceived absence, exclusion and manipulation. 
There is therefore a dialectics between design and 
implementation: the image that emerges is that of a technology 
that is well-designed in principle, but fails to meet the 
expectations coming with it. As a result, users’ entitlements seem 
to be largely neglected. 
 
A useful way to frame the issue lies in Corbridge et al.’s [2] 
vision, according to which citizens come to “see the state” 
through direct encounters with it. For vulnerable groups in India, 
these encounters are structured through the prism of anti-poverty 
programmes, through which their entitlements, to escape the 
“substantial unfreedoms” affecting their lives, are established and 
regulated. Hence, social safety nets acquire a paramount role as 
state-citizen mediators: they are not just a means for users to gain 
benefits, but one for them to access the state, and perceive it 
(“see” it) in their daily lives. 
 
This perspective, applied to our research domain, leads to regard 
technology as a factor that modifies citizens’ experience of the 
state, and that is to be seen in terms of its capabilities to improve 
access to providers. As a result, when applied to anti-poverty 
artefacts, technology needs to guarantee users’ access to their 
entitlements, for their sightings of the state to be complete. 
Through this observation, the dialectics between design and 
implementation can be led to a synthesis: the objective of greater 
access, placing entitlements of beneficiaries at the core of 
technology, should guide the harmonization of the two stages. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Our study, based on the IT system for the PDS in Karnataka, leads 
us to argue that technological artefacts are able to deeply 
reconstruct existing anti-poverty structures, enacting new agendas 
for poverty reduction. This puts into question the idea that 
technology, when applied to social safety nets, acts as a mere 
catalyst of process effectiveness: in this paper we have shown that 
IT creates, instead, whole new routes to accountability within 
anti-poverty programmes. At the same time, recipients’ perception 
of IT depends highly on how their access to core entitlements is 
affected: for anti-poverty agendas to achieve good functioning, 
entitlements should then be at the core of the dialectics of 
technology design and implementation.  
 
The argument that construction of anti-poverty artefacts should be 
directly informed by citizens’ entitlements lies at the basis of the 
normative contribution of this paper. On this there are two main 
lessons, taught by Karnataka to states currently computerizing 
their social safety nets: first, holistic monitoring of supply chains 
is preferable, as compared to full focus on the front-end side. In 
Karnataka, biometric weighing-cum-point of sale machines are 
only the interface of a composite artefact: the reconstruction of 
accountability mechanisms is not predicated on them alone, but 
on their integration with back-end monitoring. Citizens’ 
entitlements are then to be pursued, rather than just through front-
end improvements, through the harmonization of the diverse, 
integrated components of a technological assemblage. 
 
Second, enactment of anti-poverty agendas requires a focus on the 
root causes of issues, rather than simply on the effects emerging 
from them. In the case of the PDS, several measures have been 
adopted to clear corruption by the means of IT: however, little 
action has been taken to reduce the incentive to corruption, for 
example by devising means to increase the economic viability of 
ration shops. Should this line of action continue, the source of the 
core problem will not be addressed, putting in peril the outcomes 
achieved by thorough computerization of the programme. The 
final lesson here suggests, therefore, to use IT to address the 
factors identified as core sources of issues in anti-poverty nets. 
 
Technology, this paper shows, has strong potential to reconstruct 
anti-poverty mechanisms, on the basis of novel accountability 
structures. We hope that we have made an illustrative case for 
this, demonstrating how political agendas come alive in the 
making and reception of anti-poverty IT systems. And we hope to 
have drawn, on this basis, illustrative lessons for the making of 
anti-poverty artefacts, in order for the pursuit of citizens’ 
entitlements to be effectively inscribed in them.  
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